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erected by a mechanic who expended
moneyand labor at the instance of the husband: Hughesv. Peters, supra;or if made
with the full knowledge of the wife :
Capp v. Stewart, supra; or he be insolvent: Robinson v. Hoffman, Webster v.
[ildreth, supra. Because the wife could
not prevent it, and because if the estate
would be liable, it would enable the husband to destroy the separate estate, and
because a separate estate cannot be
charged by the voluntary act of another:
Corning v. Fowler, supra; Washburn v.
Sproat, 16 Mass. 449 ; Wells v. Ban-
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ister, 4 Id. 515 ; Hill on Real Prop.
54; Caswell v. Hill, 47 N. H., 407,
and cases cited.
The reasons do not appear sufficient,
because no man has a right to cheat his
creditors. To divert his meaiis to the
improvement of his wife's estate instead
of paying his debts is cheating, and a
court of equity could, in such cases,
protect the wife's property as well as his
creditors. However, the courts hold
otherwise.
"JNo. F. KELLY.
Bellaire, Ohio.
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ACCOUNT.
Account rendered-Mistace-Co2rection.-Anaccount rendered is
only prima facie evidence against the party making it: Clarlc v. Afarbourg, 33 Kans.
Where there has been no mutual examination of an account consisting of many items, and the creditor notifies the debtor of a round sum
being due thereon, which, by the mistake of the creditor is much smaller than the actual balance due, and the debtor gives his note for such
balance and receives in return a receipt in full : Held, that the creditor
may bring his action upon the original account, and if the debtor as a
defence answers and attempts to prove an account stated and settled, the
creditor may show under a reply containing a general denial that there
has been no adjustment or settlement of the items of the account between him and the debtor; that the receipt was given by him to the
debtor through mistake, and that the debtor is only entitled to credit for
the amount of the note given by him: Id.
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1884. The cases will probably appear in 114 U. S. Rep.
2 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 112 I1. Rep.
3 From A. M. F. Randolph, Esq., Reporter ; the cases will probably appear in
33 Kans. Rep.
4 From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 138 Mass. Rep.
5 From E. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter. The cases will probably appear in 41
or 42 Ohio St. Rep.
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ACTION.

See Conflict of Laws.
AGENT.

Power to Sue.-Where a principal is absent, his general agent, having sole authority to manage his business, will necessarily have authority
to bring suits to collect debts, and insurance in cases of loss by fire, such
power being essential to an efficient discharge of his duties: German
.ire Ins. Co. v. Grunert, 112 Ill.
AMENDMENT.
ASSIGNMENT.

See Sheriff.

See Conflict of Laws.

Contract-Evidence.-An agent appointed by the owner to sell coal
lands upon commission, employed another to aid him in effecting a sale,
promising to give the latter, as was claimed, one-half of his commissions
in case of a sale at a given price, which sale was effected through the
latter, and after the death of the former the latter presented a claim
against his estate for one-half of the commissions received. It was held,
on a review of the evidence, there was no equitable assignment of half
of the claim for commissions, but that the relation between the two was
merely that of creditor and debtor: Wyman v. Snyder, 112 Ill.
The burden of proof is upon a party who claims an equitable assignment of one-half of a demand, to show that fact by satisfactory evidence;
and this is not shown by proof of casual admissions or statements of
the party holding the demand, varying in form of expression and in sub
stance, especially when rebutted by the conduct and acts of the party
claiming the assignment : id.
BILLS AND INOTES.

See Duress.

Overdue Note-Receipt of Interest in Advane-Note-Surety-lnterest.-The receipt of interest in advance upon an overdue promissory
note, from the maker, does not of itself import such a giving of time as
will discharge a surety: Haydenville Say. Bank v. Parsons, 138 Mass.
Payments and the indorsements of payments, upon a promissory note
in which no rate of interest is expressed, of interest at the rate of seven
per cent. per annum, in respect of time after the note has become overdue, do not amount to a change of the contract, or satisfy the statutory
requirement of an agreement in writing to bind the maker to pay that
rate in the future : Id.
CO MON CARRIER.

See Master and Servant.

Sick Passenger-Duty of Railroad-Vegligene-Damages.-In an
action brought against a railroad company in behalf of the next of kin,
by the personal representatives of a deceased person, to recover damages
for injuries resulting in the death of such person, nominal damages may
be recovered, if it appears that his death was caused by the wrongful.
act or omission of the defendant, although no actual pecuniary damages
may have been shown or suffered: Atchison, T. & S. Railroadv. Weber,
33 Kans.
It is the duty of a railroad company carrying passengers to provide
for their quiet and comfort, and secure them against the annoying and
offensive conduct of other passengers ; and where the conduct of a pas-
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senger is such as to render his presence dangerous to fellow passengers,
or such as will occasion them serious annoyance and discomfort, it is not
only the right, but the duty of a railroad company to exclude such passenger from its train : Id.
Where an unattended passenger after entering upon a journey becomes
sick and unconscious, or insane, it is the duty of the railroad company
to remove him from the train and leave him until he is in a fit condition
to resume his journey, or until he shall obtain the necessary assistance
to take care of him to the end of his journey : Id.
The duty of a railroad company to such a passenger does not end with
his removal from the train, but it is bound to the exercise of reasonable
and ordinary care in temporarily providing for his protection and comfort; and held, that the railroad company may have exercised due care
towards such a passenger who is without friends or money when it carefully and prudently removes him from its train, and promptly places him
in charge of the overseer of the poor. The statute makes it the duty
of the overseer of the poor in any township or city to grant temporary
relief to any non-resident who may be found lying sick therein, or in
distress and without friends or money, and the expense of providing
such relief is to be paid out of the county treasury : Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

Action for Diverting Stream to .injuryof Property in another State.
-An actiqn of tort, for diverting the waters of a natural stream in this
Commonwealth, and preventing the same from coming to the plaintiff's
mill in an adjoining state, may be maintained in this Commonwealth:
Mannville Co. v. Worcester, 138 Mass.
In an action for diverting the waters of a natural stream, and preventing the same from coming to the plaintiff's mill, the fact that a certain
percentage of the water was returned to the stream may be considered
in estimating the amount of damages: Id.
Assignment of Insurance Poliey-ForeignComan*y.-If an assignment is made in this Commonwealth, between parties domiciled here, of
a policy of insurance issued by a company organized under the laws of
dnother state, but delivered here, the questions of the validity of the
assignment and of the capacity of the parties to contract are to be determined by the law of this Commonwealth: Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Allen, 138 Mass.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See CriminalLaw.

Right of Holder of Coupons of Virginia State Bonds to Pay Tawxes
therewith-Law impairing the Obligation of a Contract- What is not a
Suit against a State within the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.-In an action of detinue for personal property,
distrained by the defendant for delinquent taxes, in payment of which
the plaintiff had duly tendered coupons cut from bonds issued by the
state of Virginia under the funding act of March 30th 1871, held,
that by the terms of that act, and the issue of bonds and coupons in
virtue of the same, a contract was made between every coupon holder
and the state that such coupons should ,1he receivable at and after maturity for all taxes, debts, dues and demands due the state ;" the right
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of the coupon-holder, under which, was to have his coupons received for
taxes when offered, and that any act of the state which forbids the receipt of these coupons for taxes is a violation of the contract, and void
as against coupon-holders: -'oindexter v. Greenhow, S. 0. U. S., Oct.
Term, 1884.
An action or suit brought by a tax-payer, who has duly tendered such
coupons in payment of his taxes, against the person who, under color of
office as tax collector, and acting in the enforcement of a void law,
passed by the legislature of the state, having refused such tender of
coupons, proceeds by seizure and sale of the property of the plaintiff, to
enforce the collection of such taxes, is an action or suit against him
personally as a wrongdoer, and not against the state, within the meanng of the eleventh amendment to the constitution of the United
States: Id.
CONTRACT. See Coflictof.Laws
CORPORATION.

See .Municipal Corporation.

Subscription to Stock-Liability of Subscriber for .Debts.-There is
no liability on a subscription to the stock of a corporation, the amount
of whose capital stock is fixed, until the whole amount of the stock is
subscribed: Temple v. Lemon, 112 Ill.
A subscriber to the capital stock of a proposed corporation, when the
full amount of stock fixed by law or by the action of those connected
therewith is not subscribed, cannot be held liable individually fora debt
of such corporation, unless for some cause he has estopped himself from
alleging that the whole of the fixed capital stock was never subscribed:
Id.
COSTS. See Frrorsand Appeals.
CRIMINAL LAW.

Presentment or Indictment by a GrandJury-Infamous Crime- ConstitutionalLaw.-A person sentenced to imprisonment for an infamous
crime, without having been presented or indicted by a grand jury, as
required by the fifth amendment of the constitution of the United States,
is entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of
the United States: Ex parte Wilson, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
A crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of years at hard labor
is an infamous crime, within the provision of the fifth amendment of
the constitution, that " no person shall be held to answer for a capital
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a grand jury: Id.
DAMAGES.

See Conflict of Laws; Malicious Prosecution.
DIVORcE.

Insane Wife-Suit by Guardian.-Theguardian of an insane woman
cannot bring and maintain an action against her husband for divorce and
alimony, or for alimony alone: Birdsell v. Birdsell, 33 Kans.
DOMsICILE.

Infant Orphan residing with a Grandparent.-Tbe grandfather or
grandmother of an infant, when the next. of kin, is the guardian by
VoL. X=III

.- GI
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nature of such infant; and infants having a domicile in one state, who
after the death of both their parents take up their residence at the home
of their paternal grandmother and next of kin in another state, acquire
her domicile: Lamar v. Micou, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
DURESS.

.Note given by Person under Arrest.-No action can be maintained
upon a promissory note, given by a person while under arrest on a complaint for larceny of property exceeding in value $100, to the owner of
the property alleged to have been stolen, under an agreement that the
complaint shall be placed on file, the plaintiff having received the note
with notice of the circumstances ; and the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused person is not open in such action : Gorham v.
.Keyes, 138 Mlass.
EQUITY. See Assignment.
Practice-Allowing New Answer.-A motion by a defendant in a bill,
to set aside an interlocutory decree and for leave to file a new answer, is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with which this court
will not interfere, unless it can see that such discretion has been abused:
Schmidt v. Braley, 162 Ill.
The proper practice in a case where a defendant desires to file a new
answer to the bill, is to prepare the answer and submit it to the court
with the motion for leave to file it. If the proposed new answer is friveleus, impertinent or scandalous, the court should not allow it to be filed:
Id.
Reformation-Specific Performance-Evidence.-Inan action to reform a contract and for relief thereunder, after the same is reformed,
the court may specifically enforce the same when that may be done, or
may give adequate compensation for its non-performance : Columbus &
Toledo Railroad v. Steinfield, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
On trial of an action to reform a written substituted contract for fraud
or mistake, and to enforce the same when reformed, or if the same could
not be reformed, then to rescind the written contract, there may be given
in evidence the original writing made by the same parties upon the subject-matter in dispute, and also the subsequent acts done or procured to
be done by the party charged with the fraud and which tend to prove
the fraud or mistake : Id.
On such a trial, the court may find that the written contract in dispute does not contain the true agreement of the parties, but if the party
complaining neither pays back nor offers to return the money received
by him under the contract, it is error to order the contract to be set
aside and held for naught: Id.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.

Motion to Dsmiss Writ of Errorfor want of Jurisdiction.- Costs on.
-The Supreme Court of the United States upon dismissing a writ of
error for want of jurisdiction can adjudge to the defendant in error the
costs incident to his motion to dismiss, though not the costs of the suit:
Bradstreet Co. v. Higgins, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
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EVIDENCE. See Account ; Assignment; Negligence.
To show .Pain-Physician.-Onthe trial in an action for a personal
injury, the plaintiff called his attending physician, who testified that he
had examined the plaintiff, who stated the symptoms, and that he had
suffered pain. The witness was then asked whether the plaintiff was
feigning or "making believe," to which he answered, "No, sir; I know
he did not, from examination and tests :" Held, that, with the explanation as to his means of knowledge, there was no error in the admission
of the evidence. The answer could only be understood as a deduction
or conclusion from the examination and tests made: Chicago, B. & Q.
Railroad Co. v. Martin, 112 Ill.
In such a case, the attending physician, having every means of observing the symptoms, may be asked if the patient suffered pain, and his
answer in the affirmative can be considered only as an opinion based
upon actual facts and tests. It does not even require an expert to know
the existence of pain from the nature of the injury and the patient's
outward manifestations: Id.
FIXTURE.
Fence budlt on Land of another-Notice-Purchaser.-Afence built
by one person upon the land of another under a parol license or agreement that it might be removed at the will of the builder, becomes a
fixture which will pass with a grant of the land to a bona fide purchaser
without notice of the adverse title to such fence: Rowand v. Anderson, 33 Kans.
The legal effect of attaching an improvement of a permanent character to land may be controlled by the agreement of the parties as between
themselves and those who have knowledge of such agreement, but a
parol agreement cannot be sustained or held to be binding upon a subsequent vendee who had no notice of the parol agreement under which
the structure was annexed to the land : Id,
Under the facts stated in this case, held, that the location of the fence
and its use were not sufficient to reasonably excite inquiry regarding the
ownership of the fence, nor were they sufficient to charge the plaintiff
with notice of the adverse interest therein: Id.
HIGHWAY.

Municipal Corporation-DeectiveSidewalc--_Negligence.-The fact
that a person uses a street or sidewalk after he has notice that it is out
of repair is not necessarily negligence. Persons are not to be entirely
debarred from the use of a street because it may be defective or somewhat
dangerous, but where danger exists, and it is known, ordinary prudence
would require of those using such street, greater vigilance and care and
caution, corresponding with the danger, to avoid injury: City of Emporia v. Scmidliny, 33 Kans.
In an action brought against a city to recover for personal injuries
alleged to have resulted from a defective sidewalk, the fact that the walk
in question was removed by the city authorities and another and a better
one substituted therefor soon after the injury occurred, may be considered as a circumstance tending to show that the walk removed was out
of repair, but it is no evidence that the city authorities had knowledge
of the defect before the occurrence of the injury : Id.
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Defective Sidewalk-Yegligence- Use of Velocipede-It cannot be
ruled, as matter of law, that the use of v velocipede upon a sidewalk of
a street is necessarily unlawful : Purple v. Greenfield, 138 Mass.
An opening about a foot and a half deep, a little more than a foot in
width, and two feet and a half long, was made six inches from the line
of the sidewalk in a town, for the purpose of furnishing light and air to
the cellar of a building. There was nothing to indicate where the line
of the sidewalk ended. The opening had existed for some months, and
was covered by a loose board, and was known to be so covered by the
chairman of the selectmen of the town. While the board was off, a
person travelling on the highway stepped into the opening. Held, in an
action against the town for an injury thereby occasioned, that the jury
were authorized to find that the town had reasonable notice of a hole,
insecurely guarded, near the limit of the highway: Id.
.Municipal Corporation-Negligence.-Atown is not bound to erect
barriers to prevent a person travelling with a horse and wagon from
straying from a highway, although there is a dangerous place thirty-four
feet from the marked travelled part of the highway, and nine and a half
feet from the line of the location of the highway, which he may reach
by so straying: Barnes v. Chocopee, 138 Mass.
HUSBAND AND WIPE. See Divorce.
Contract to Chargeseparate Estate-Action on.contract by which
a married woman charges her separate estate, in equity, with the payment of a debt, need not be in writing : Elliott v. Lawhead, 41 or 42
Ohio St.
An action founded on such a contract, where a personal judgment
against a married woman is not authorized, is of an equitable nature, of
which a court of equity alone has jurisdiction: Id.
The rule that a creditor must exhaust his remedy at law before seeking
equitable relief, does not apply to an action to charge the separate estate
of a married woman for the payment of a claim, where the statute gives
no remedy at law: Id.
A prior action to recover a money judgment, in which it is sought to
reach the same separate property by attachment., in which the plaintiff
fails, is no bar to a suit in equity to charge such separate property, with
the judgment of the same claim : Id.
INFANT.

See Domicile.

INJUNCTION.

A ProperRemedy to Prevent Collection of Taxes by Distraintafter Tender in Tax-receivable Coupons.-The remedy by injunction to prevent the
collection of taxes by distraint upon the rolling stock, machinery, cars,
and engines, and other property of railroad corporations, after a tender
of payment in tax-receivable coupons, is sanctioned by repeated decisions
of this court, and has become common and unquestioned practice, in
similar cases, where exemptions have been claimed in virtue of the constitution of the United States; the ground of the jurisdiction being
that there is no adequate remedy at law: Allen v. B. & 0. Railroad
Co., S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
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NSURANCE.

See Conflt of Laws.

Assignment to Person having no Insurable Interest.-If a policy of
insurance on the life of another is issued to a person having an insurable
interest in such life, an assignment of such policy to a person having no
such insurable interest does not render the assignment void: .mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass.
Proof of Loss- Time- Waiver-Absence of Insured.W here a policy of insurance requires the assured, within thirty days after any loss
by fire, to furnish proofs of the same, signed and sworn to by him, the
proof of loss should be so signed and sworn to, unless there is some legal
excuse. His absence at the time of the loss, and failure to return in
time, is a sufficient legal excuse, and in such case the proofs may be
signed and verified by his agent having charge of his business: German
.Fire Ins. Co. v. Grunert, 112 Ill.
Where written notice and proof of loss are made out and delivered to
the insurance company within the required time, by the agent of the
assured, the latter being absent from home, and the company returns
notice and proofs, with objections thereto, and they are amended by the
agent and again delivered, and they are again sent back for amendment,
which is made, and this is repeated several other times, this will be held
a waiver by the company of the objection that such notice and proofs
were not delivered in proper time: Id.
Condition against Vacation of Building.-An absolute condition in a
fire insurance policy, on a dwelling-house, that the policy shall be void
"if the building insured be vacated or left unodeupied," avoids the policy, although the vacation of the house results from the permanent removal of the tenant of the insured during the running of his lease,
without the knowledge or consent of the landlord: Farmers' Ins. Co.
v. Wells, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
INTEREST.

See Bills and Notes.
JUDGMENT.

Confession-Power of Clerk in acation-Meaning of VacationJudicialAct.-Where a circuit court adjourned over for thirty-two days,
it was held that the period intervening in which the court did not sit
and transact business was to be regarded as vacation, within the meaning of that word in section 66 of the Practice Act, authorizing judgments by confession in vacation. But the word is not to be understood
as embracing all the time the court is not actually in session, or as embracing the time of an adjournment from day to day: Conkling v.
Ridgelg, 112 Ill.
LImITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Public iNuisance-Rightof Actionfor-Lapse of Time.-Maintaining
a nuisance for twenty years does not give a prescriptive right to maintain it: Inhab. of New Salem v. Eagle Mill, 138 Mass.
An action, by a person who suffers a peculiar and special damage from
a public nuisance, may be maintained against a person who continues
the nuisance, although a recovery for the injury done by the creation of
the nuisance is barred by the Statute of Limitations : Id.
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LUNATIC.

See .Divorce.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

Corporation-Attachment-Damiages.-Anaction may be maintained
against a corporation to recover damages for wrongfully, maliciously and
without just or probable cause, obtaining and levying an order of attachment upon personal property: Western News Co. v. Wilmarth, 33 Kans.
Where it is alleged in a petition brought to recover damages therefor,
that an order of attachment was wrongfully, maliciously, and without
just or probable cause sued out; that a stock of goods was levied thereon
and withheld from the owner for about two months, and thereby
his business completely broken up, it is not error on the part of the
court, trying the case without a jury, to receive evidence showing the
value of the stock on hand at the time of the attachment; that the owner
was doing a business from $6000 to $7000 per annum, with a net profit
of $1500 to $1600 per year, and that on account of the attachment proceedings his business was broken up, as in such a case vindictive or
exemplary damages are allowable : Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

Common Carrier-Assistancerendered by Passenger at request of
Driver-Injury through Paul of Driver.-The plaintiff was a passenger
on defendant's street railroad, on a car northward bound. The railway
was a single track, with occasional side-tracks for the passage of cars
moving in opposite directions. The northbound car, having been drawn
beyond the side-track, where it was to have met the southbound- car, it
became necessary to push it back to the side-track, so that the cars could
pass and each proceed to its destination. At the request of the driver
of the northbound car, the plaintiff assisted him in pushing the car
back to the side-track. While so engaged, without fault on his part, he
was injured by the carelessness of defendant's driver on the southbound
car: Held, 1. The plaintiff did not engage in the service of defendant as a mere volunteer. 2. Under the circumstances the plaintiff cannot be considered as a fellow-servant with the driver of the southbound
car. 3. In the case stated, the doctrine of respondeat superior applies:
McIntire Street Rd. v. Bolton, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
MORTGAGE.

Assumption of Mortgage Debt-Liability of Purchaser.-Apurchaser
of mortgaged premises from the mortgagor, who assumes payment of the
mortgage debt, or who accepts a conveyance reciting his assumption of
the same with a knowledge of such recital, will at once become personally liable to the mortgagee for the mortgage indebtedness, and he cannot defeat the mortgagee's right to hold him responsible, by procuring
a release from the mortgagor : Bay v. Williams, 112 I1.
The acceptance by the purchaser, of a conveyance by a mortgagor of
his equity of redemption in mortgaged premises, is a sufficient consideration for a promise by the grantee to assume and pay the mortgage
debt: 1d.
A promise by one, upon a valuable consideration moving from another,
to pay the debt of that other to a third person, inures to the benefit of
such third person; and his right to maintain an action upon it is vested
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in him by force of the agreement itself. The express assent of the beneficiary is not essential to his right to avail of its benefits : 1d.
Subrogation-Money obtained on Forged .Afortgage to pay off Valid
ifortgage-Rightsof Xortgagee.-Where money is loaned upon the security of what is supposed to be a valid mortgage, but which in fact is
a forged and void mortgage, and the money is so loaned for the purpose
that a prior valid mortgage may be discharged, which is done, the mortgagee of the void mortgage may be subrogated to the rights of the prior
mortgagee, there being intervening liens or incumbrances , Everston, v.
Central Bank, 33 Kans.
And in such a case, where the mortgagee of the void mortgage assigns
the same in the regular course of business to an innocent purchaser, such
innocent purchaser takes the place of the mortgagee of the void mortgage with all his rights of subrogation ; Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
NEGLIGENCE.

See Highwayi.

See Common Carrier; Highway; Master and Servant.

Crossing Railroad-Duty to Look or Listen.-It is the duty of a
person about to cross a railway track to make a vigilant use of his
senses, as far as there is an opportunity, in order to ascertain if there is
a present danger in crossing. A failure to listen or look, when by
taking this precaution the injury might have been avoided, is negligence
that will bar a recovery, notwithstanding the negligence of the railroad
company in failing to give signals contributed to the injury: Union
Pacific Railroadv. Adams, 33 Kans.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.

Fraudin obtaining-Bonafide tolder-7Tnited States.-Where, by
the connivance of a clerk in the office of an assistant treasurer of the
United States, a person unlawfully obtains from that office money belonging to the United States, and, to replace it, pays to the clerk money
which he obtains by fraud from a bank, the clerk having no knowledge
of the means by which the latter money was obtained, the United States
are not liable to refund the money to the bank. The case distinguished
from United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S. 30: State Bank v. United
States, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
NOTICE.

See Fketure.

Posssession,under Contract of Sale-Paiment to Vendor in ignorance
of subsequent Afortgage.-A. loaned to B. a sum of money, receiving B.'t
promissory note and a mortgage on real estate to secure the same; bus
when A. accepted the note and mortgage, C. was in actual possession of
the premises, and resided thereon with his family: Hield, that A. was
chargeable with notice of C.'s rights and interest in the premises; and,
A. having assigned the note and mortgage his assignee occupied the
same situation; nor will the fact that A. and his assignee did not know
that. C. was in possession, make any difference: Ranney v. Hardy, 41
or 42 Ohio St.
B. sold to C. real estate, placed him in possesiion, and agreed in
writing to execute to him a deed on payment of the purchase-money in
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monthly instatments. Subsequently B. executed to A. a mortgage on
the premises, which was recorded: Held, that such mortgage was valid,
but subordinate to the rights of C.; that 0. may validly make payments of. purchase-money to B. until A. or his assignee, by suit, or in
some other unequivocal form, asserts the right to receive from C. the
unpaid instalments of purchase-money; and that the assignee of C. has
the same right: 1d.
NUISANCE.

See Limitations, Statute of.
PARTNERSHIP.

Insolvency-Liability of a Retiring Member.-Where a member of a
partnership retires from it, and his copartners, who continue the business,
thereupon agree, in good faith, to pay him a sum certain as his share of
the capital, and the firm afterwards unexpectedly turns out to have been
insolvent at the time of the said withdrawal: Held, that a bank from
which the new firm had borrowed money which they had partly used in
making payments to the said retiring member, could not in equity charge
the old firm with the money loaned to the new, nor the retiring partner
with the moneys obtained from it and used to pay him, the retiring partner having paid in discharge of the debts of the old firm, more than the
amount received by him as his share of the capital thereof: Penn Bank
v. Furness, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
R.AiitoAD.

See Common Carrier.

SALE.
Ambiguous Terms-iabilityof Vendee.-Where a proposition to sell
goods is sent by a writing, that, by mistake, is ambiguous; and, knowing of such ambiguity, the receiver of the writing claiming an improbable meaning, unreasonably favorable to himself, and not intended or
thought of by the sender, and without notice to the sender or inquiry
of him as to his intended meaning, orders the goods, obtains, and uses
them, such receiver of the goods is liable to the seller of the same for
the value of the goods used, as if no proposition had been sent: Butler
v. Moses, 41 or 42 Ohio St.

UsuRY.
Separate Loans-Deduction of whole Usury from last Loan.-In
1869, 1870 and 1872, A. loaned money to B., taking at each loan a promissory note therefor, the note for the loan of 1870 embracing also the
amount of the loan of 1869, and the note for the loan of 1872, embracing also the amount of the two preceding loans. In each of the notes
asurious interest was incorporated. Held, that in an action to foreclose
a mortgage given to secure the payment of the note of 1872, and obtain
a sale of the mortgaged premises, all the illegal interest should be
deducted: Beals v. Lewis, Ohio St.

